字幕と要約

Video ID: Kgdnt-Es6VM

動画を見る
要約記事を読む
READING NOTE · AI 要約

歴史的データから読み解く社会の不安定化と未来予測

3行でわかるこの動画

  • 歴史学と複雑系科学を融合させた「クリオダイナミクス」を用い、社会がなぜ安定し、なぜ崩壊するのかを分析している。
  • 現代の米国社会で見られる「富のポンプ(格差拡大)」と「エリートの過剰生産」が、過去の多くの社会と同様に不安定化を招いている。
  • 社会が危機に至る過程は予測可能だが、危機を乗り越えた後の結末には複数の可能性が存在する。

現代社会への警鐘と予測の検証

  • 2010年、筆者らは複雑系科学の視点から、米国の政治的不安定さが今後高まるという予測を立てた。
  • 1970年代以降、米国では反政府デモや暴力的な暴動の傾向が反転し、2021年の連邦議会議事堂襲撃事件など、予測が裏付けられるような事態が進行している。
  • 現在の不安定な状況は、科学的な理論に基づいて抽出されたデータであり、単なる個人の推測ではない。

社会を動かす二つのエンジン:富のポンプとエリートの過剰生産

  • 「富のポンプ」とは、労働者の賃金が抑制される一方で、経済的エリートへ富が集中する現象を指す。
  • 1970年代以降、労働生産性は向上したものの、一般的な労働者の賃金は伸び悩み、経済格差が著しく拡大した。
  • 格差の拡大は、労働者の困窮(絶望死や孤立)と、政治的地位を巡るエリート同士の競争激化という二つの副作用を生んでいる。

「エリートの過剰生産」と反体制エリートの台頭

  • 大学進学率の上昇や高学歴化により、限られた権力の座を狙う「エリート志願者」が過剰に供給されている。
  • ポスト(椅子)の数が増えない中で、競争に敗れた者たちが、現状の社会秩序を破壊しようとする「反体制エリート(カウンター・エリート)」化する。
  • 歴史上、弁護士などの高学歴層が反体制運動のリーダーになるケースが多く、現在のエリートの過剰供給は社会にとって大きなリスク要因である。

危機後の未来はどうなるか

  • 歴史的分析によれば、危機に至るまでの道筋は避けがたいほど強固だが、危機発生後の結末は一つではない。
  • 過去の事例では、戦争や革命、パンデミックなどの暴力的なショックを経て、再び格差が縮小(圧縮)するケースが多く見られた。
  • 社会の危機は絶望的な終末を意味するだけでなく、その後の舵取りによって、より良い社会秩序へ転換する可能性も残されている。

まとめ

  • 社会の不安定化は、経済的な富の分配の偏りと、エリート間の激しい権力闘争によって引き起こされる構造的な現象である。
  • 現代の米国で見られる分断や暴力の兆候は、過去の歴史的サイクルにおいて何度も繰り返されてきたプロセスの一環である。
  • 危機的な局面をどう乗り越えるかは、その後の社会構造の再構築にかかっており、今後の動向を注意深く見守る必要がある。
字幕を読む

文字起こし / 字幕

ja

It's easy to believe that the world is falling apart. Uh but is it really? Uh is it in fact the case that uh we're on the brink of an apocalypse or is humanity just going through an uncomfortable what we might call in physics phase transition to a new world

physics phase transition to a new world order. Uh well fortunately there are scientists and scholars who study these things as a branch of complex system theory. And uh tonight's lecturer Peter Turchin is one

tonight's lecturer Peter Turchin is one such person. So he's the long list of uh positions but uh he's project leader of the complexity science hub in Vienna Austria Vienna uh and the founding director of SEAT I'm not sure if I

director of SEAT I'm not sure if I pronounced that correctly which is a global history datab bank. He's also a research associate at the University of Oxford and ameritus professor at the University of Connecticut, but I keep trying to pronounce that the American

trying to pronounce that the American way and I can't do it, but I'm sure you know where it is. So, he's currently investigating how it is that millions of humans can come to cooperate and conversely what causes

cooperate and conversely what causes formally stable communities to suddenly fall apart. I came across his work from the glooily titled book end times. Uh but there is now I should say another book uh the great policy and

book uh the great policy and transformation. Uh so is it doomed soon? Well I hope not. Uh but I look forward to finding out this evening. So ladies and gentlemen, please welcome Dr. Peter

gentlemen, please welcome Dr. Peter Terti. Thank you very much for this wonderful introduction, Paul. Um, you can hear me, right? This thing is working. Okay,

right? This thing is working. Okay, let's put it away. >> Not very well. >> Hear you very well. >> Ah, yes. Thank you. How's this? Is this better?

better? >> No. Let's see. Wait, let me just turn it around. Uh, Uh, see see >> always use the handheld mic and

>> always use the handheld mic and >> uh because that takes one of my arms away. Okay. Uh, though it's still not working. Yeah.

One more try.

>> That's Yeah. doesn't get doesn't get me wrong. >> You're just gonna want to project. So, I'm gonna Well, if I speak like this, right? I mean, yeah, I'm actually have a reasonably loud voice, so you should be

reasonably loud voice, so you should be able to hear a bit. Is this better now? Okay. All right.

So um 16 years ago scientific uh magazine Nature asked a bunch of scientists including myself to make predictions for the next decade or the decade uh to 2020. And most um people have written about

And most um people have written about wonderful scientific discoveries that they expect or maybe technological advances. But I decided to take a slightly different route because by that time I was trained as a complexity

time I was trained as a complexity scientist. I worked uh in population dynamics but by that time I switched into uh what I call cle we call cleo dynamics. I'll talk a bit more about it later. And one of the topics that we

later. And one of the topics that we were interested in was political stability and instability. And so I decided to stick my neck out. We had a theory which was already developed on studying past societies and that theory

studying past societies and that theory made uh interesting predictions about what the societies that we live in United States might have to experience. And so um I uh we published in um

And so um I uh we published in um January 2010 uh this um uh prediction. So um of course um um uh 10 years later

So um of course um um uh 10 years later when 2020 it hit um the road um we decided to revisit this forecast and to see how well it has held up. All right.

see how well it has held up. All right. And so together with my colleague Andre Katay we submitted the paper in early 2020 to loss one. And as the paper was going through the review things really

going through the review things really accelerated. So in the paper we first of all we pointed out to some data on uh on proxies for instability. So one of them is anti-government demonstrations and as

is anti-government demonstrations and as you can see um the uh anti-government demonstrations in a bunch of um um uh western uh democratic um uh societies

western uh democratic um uh societies had been declining by 2010 and that actually led many people for example Stephen Pinker published a book right around 20 209 talking about how violence declines and

talking about how violence declines and how the how reason is triumphing and things like that. But um our data which I will be talking about in my talk was pointing us in a different direction. Um

pointing us in a different direction. Um another proxy is violent uh de demonstr violent riots. Again we see a very similar uh overall pattern decline towards 2010 which made people quite

towards 2010 which made people quite optimistic and then there was a a trend reversal and um um and uh uh an outbreak of violence. So this was this data goes

of violence. So this was this data goes to 2008. Now in as we were u uh as our paper was working through the works at plus one then the summer of 2020 happened and then of course in January

happened and then of course in January uh on January 6 of 2021 we had a pretty traumatic uh experience uh in the United States. So I think at this point um and then since then things have been getting

then since then things have been getting more and more dire. In fact, uh the last uh month uh makes me uh really worried about um our fates. I was I'm an optimist myself, but uh the uh recent uh

optimist myself, but uh the uh recent uh developments are not really uh provide much ground for optimism. So uh so I think that in a fairly disastrous way this uh prediction actually turned out

this uh prediction actually turned out to be uh true. So um what I want to talk about uh is several things. First of all, where did this forecast come from? All right. Uh we'll talk um I'll talk about because I'm a complexity

about because I'm a complexity scientist, I use the dynamical systems approach and I I think that it's extremely uh extremely useful approach to study human societies and this is where we'll talk about Cleoynamics. So

where we'll talk about Cleoynamics. So cleo dynamics is essentially comes from Cleo is the muse of history who is uh pictured here. She has thrown her usual acutments away and is using now a computer and that's what we are and

computer and that's what we are and dynamics of course is the science of change. So it's really um why and how um and what are the causal factors uh driving the historical dynamics of all kinds of different uh characteristics of

kinds of different uh characteristics of societies and then I'll talk about two um uh two central concepts that we have developed the wealth pump and the production and then little towards the end we'll talk a bit a bit about the crisis and after math and I'm also happy

crisis and after math and I'm also happy to as long as you have uh good questions and to answer them.

All right. So, um first of all, I want to say that this forecast was not um a prophecy where you don't know where it's coming from. It was a scientific prediction. What's a um uh characteristic of scientific predictions? Future is essentially

predictions? Future is essentially unpredictable. But um we want to understand how the world works and we have different theories. You have rival theories that explain how the world the world works.

explain how the world the world works. So you have many different theories for why um societies go into outbreaks of political violence and sometimes outright collapse. So the question becomes how do we distinguish between

becomes how do we distinguish between those theories and the good old scientific uh method is that we extract quantitative predictions from those theories. All right and then we test them with data and we've done a lot of

them with data and we've done a lot of that using retrodictions by predicting different types of societies past societies from which the theory was developed. But of course the strongest uh possible prediction is to to make a

uh possible prediction is to to make a prediction about future dynamics. So I had no expectation whatsoever that my um forecast would be uh so successful because I was expecting things would go quite differently and that would give us

quite differently and that would give us a chance to learn about um the um limitations of theory and of course in many ways things have gone uh differently but so we'll be talking about that anyway. So the theory that u uh that uh on which this forecast was

uh that uh on which this forecast was based and which was uh to be tested by uh by this prediction um was developed by looking at historical data. So I will be showing you a lot of time series data. I should also mention that there

data. I should also mention that there is a strong mathematical component or rather computational models. So we use a lot of computational models fairly quite a lot of statistical results and things like that. those I'm going to sweep under the rug. Just keep in mind that

under the rug. Just keep in mind that all that stuff is there but I want to aim at giving you some understanding of dynamics and that's why I will be showing a lot of time series. So when we look at instability dynamics for past societies for France for

for past societies for France for example or for um Roman um Roman politics from republic to the empire what we see a very typical situation that they can go for maybe a century or

that they can go for maybe a century or so uh with pretty u good internal order peace and order right or here for example uh But almost inevitably uh and

example uh But almost inevitably uh and some kind of end times come. So we see these huge outbreaks of violence and they tend to recur at two or three century uh intervals. All right. Also note that uh there is a lot of

note that uh there is a lot of jaggedness here. You can see ups and downs. This data is resolved at 50 at 25 year intervals. So we see this 50 year uh cycles. Now it turns out that our society this is what the work I did in

society this is what the work I did in preparation during around 2010 is not immune from those um from those cycles and that's quite remarkable because if you think about it over the past 200 years human societies have dramatically

years human societies have dramatically transformed but um but still there is and and our models have to take that into account but we still are susceptible to the same types of things. So here for example if you look at

So here for example if you look at United States uh there's of course a big outbreak during the American Revolution and then for the next 40 years the u um the um

the um instability as measured by variety of different types of uh instability events declined. So 1820 was actually known as the year as the era of good feelings. But then things started to accelerate

But then things started to accelerate and this is actually for for a warning sign. By 1860 we had a civil war which is not even here because civil war is two orders of magnitude larger events than any of those riots or and so on. Then uh this spike was followed by

Then uh this spike was followed by little you know uh but still highly weighted another spike and then we got we had another year of good feelings around 1950s and 1960s right and a spike in 1970s. So um in uh the prediction of

in 1970s. So um in uh the prediction of 2020 was taking into account both both the structural factors about which I will be talking about uh in a minute but also this 50-year um periodicity. This 50 year uh human

50 year uh human dynamics of human societies are complex. There are basically two different engines driving it. One of them is the secular cycles which gives you couple hundred years uh characteristic periods but on top of that you have this father

but on top of that you have this father and son's cycles. I'm happy to talk about that later and that gives you two generational cycles. What's not notable that when structural demographic conditions are very favorable they will suppress those uh spikes and that's what

suppress those uh spikes and that's what you see. So, so back uh in 2010 uh the question was uh what what was was there going to be another spike in uh in the 2020s and that's what we see here. So um

2020s and that's what we see here. So um I just did recently we have done this is a fiveyear um step here. So we did it for the for the first half of the 20s and that's that we we are there we are over we are way over this uh peak of uh

over we are way over this uh peak of uh late 1960s and 1970s already. Okay. So um so uh complex human societies I argue are uh dynamical systems based on first of all having

systems based on first of all having seeing this recurrent dynamics but more importantly we see that this secular cycle is a very fundamental dynamic. It affects not only instability itffects uh

affects not only instability itffects uh population um uh well-being and imiseration. It affects uh power structure, elites and their uh relationships with the rest of the society. It affects also the state

society. It affects also the state structures. And so that's how we approach it. I want to show you the equations but we represent the uh the system the social system a state aality this is a state level system right

this is a state level system right because we have in fact uh the state is a uh here is uh a um an an actor an agent in this u web of u feedbacks but

agent in this u web of u feedbacks but most of the population uh is here and we look at a variety of indicators such as population numbers, age structure, organization and so on and so forth. Then I'll talk more about elites later. This is a small proportion of population

This is a small proportion of population that concentrates social power in their hands. And you also look at similar types of characteristics. All right. And then the state uh which is uh most important things are the uh balance of

important things are the uh balance of um of uh re revenues and expenditures and state legitimacy. And what we're trying to understand is how instability or otherwise stability emerges from all those interactions. And also instability

those interactions. And also instability of course acts on all those other um um components of the system.

Okay. So what I'm going to do because um my time is limited I will focus on uh these two uh components um because uh this this is where uh the most of the

this this is where uh the most of the action uh actually is and so let's first talk about population all right and we are interested in things like uh uh well-being here and then I'll talk about

well-being here and then I'll talk about the elites all Right. So the first thing we note that if you look at one measure of economic well-being which is real wages then we see um a very strange uh pattern

then we see um a very strange uh pattern here. We're looking at uh two different uh wage series all scaled to u to uh index of 100 in 1927. And we see that both series have grown quite

both series have grown quite dramatically until roughly speaking late 1970s. in fact uh three and a half or even fourfold. That was the period of unprecedented um affluence for the

unprecedented um affluence for the common people and then it stopped and uh in fact during the 19 uh 80s we we see a decline little bit break uh up

we see a decline little bit break uh up in in the 1990s and another decline uh here especially for the unskilled rates. So um this was um u a a very uh strange

So um this was um u a a very uh strange strange development and in fact many of you have seen another version because uh the um uh GDP per capita continue to grow fairly well. So many of you have

grow fairly well. So many of you have seen this um u this graph where uh productivity of American workers and productivity is closely u closely related to GDP per capita. So they grow

related to GDP per capita. So they grow together until mid1 1970s and then they uh spread out right. So what happened to all that productivity? Where did it go if it did not go to the m to to workers

if it did not go to the m to to workers to typical workers either uh unskilled or manufacturing which is a fairly um which used to be fairly favorable um sector of the profession. Well, the way

sector of the profession. Well, the way to look at it, I think, is um is to look at the ratio of GDP per capita. So, we divide wage u by ratio of GDP per

divide wage u by ratio of GDP per capita. A nice thing about that is that uh we don't need a good measure of inflation because once you go beyond u into the uh 19th century u the measures of inflation become much worse. In fact,

of inflation become much worse. In fact, even today there is a lot of arguments about how to u what does it mean to have a real wage. I actually have a whole chapter in my book end times that Paul mentioned dissecting it. But what we can do, we can take GDP in nominal dollars

do, we can take GDP in nominal dollars and um and median wage in also nominal dollars and divide one by the other. And then we can extend our um time series back into the late uh uh 18th century.

back into the late uh uh 18th century. And so what we will see when we do that is that during the first uh uh uh 50 years or so until 1830 uh relative wage has been growing. This

uh relative wage has been growing. This means that workers were actually being paid more than they were producing. Workers were actually getting ahead of the um of the general productivity of the society. All right.

productivity of the society. All right. Then there was a break point and we have we see this decline stagnation and then another one starting from 1910 or so you have this is the period we looked at in the previous graph right where again

the previous graph right where again workers were actually gaining ground. Workers were gaining ground and the wealthy people were losing ground. The numbers of uh billionaires and millionaires was declining during this period. It was the great compression but then it did not last. there was another

then it did not last. there was another turning point and then we see this u this um um decline in the relative of age. Now notice if you just superimpose the graph of instability you will see that it's

of instability you will see that it's almost perfectly opposite. You have decline to 1820 increase and then another decline to 1960 and increase. So um so there this is very suspicious that

um so there this is very suspicious that um there is such a dynamical uh correlation between those two uh to um time series. Of course correlation is not causation but I but we can actually

not causation but I but we can actually um I'm I'm going to put to you in a bit of abbreviated form the actual causal mechanism. So essentially this is what I call the wealth pump. So the periods um

call the wealth pump. So the periods um uh when um uh these periods are when the wealth pump is operating in in a perverse way it's taking from the workers from the com from the common people and giving it to the elites and same thing here but the wealth pump can

same thing here but the wealth pump can operate in both uh direction but when it does operate um in uh favor of elites right we uh see um um the f we see the following

following um um patterns. First of all, why um what turns the wealth pump on? It depends on the society. Uh the mechanisms for agrarian societies, pre-industrial societies are somewhat

pre-industrial societies are somewhat different from the mechanisms that we see in developed societies. But essentially, it's um there is a general explanation which has to do with what's known in sociology as the iron law of

known in sociology as the iron law of oligarch. Essentially um after periods after a couple of generations of u integrative periods during which the social stability is high the elites get

social stability is high the elites get very used to it um and uh they um are tempted to start rejiggering uh the economy and society in general in the favor of themselves. They sort of

the favor of themselves. They sort of switch from pro-social elites to selfish elites. And when they do that they um start putting uh in a variety of instruments. So for example in the United States

United States um um the Reagan period was the very clear period when workers had their power taken away from them as a result of uh attack on the labor unions. the u

attack on the labor unions. the u minimum wage, real minimum wage uh minimum wage was not increased and so uh there was no support for the poorest things. There was u um fairly massive immigration and u movement of jobs uh

immigration and u movement of jobs uh overseas and so all those factors um a number of economists more on the left leaning side argue that these were conscious decisions by the economic elites to increase their profits at the

elites to increase their profits at the expense of workers. This is somewhat controversial but um certainly the fact is that they have turned around and turned they have turned on the wealth

turned they have turned on the wealth pump and turned around relative wage. All right. So this um operation of the wealth pump u um has three consequences.

u um has three consequences. The first one is it results in popular imiseration and we saw that in the decline of in the stagnation of real wages and the decline of relative wages. But when I'm talking about emiseration,

But when I'm talking about emiseration, I mean actually pretty absolute emiseration. So here is a very famous set of uh uh of um data from um um uh uh

set of uh uh of um data from um um uh uh and deton and Angus um sorry and case and Angus Don the economists who have u introduced the idea of the deaths of despair. So what we see here is that um

despair. So what we see here is that um the uh um as um the that prosperity period started they have declined quite a lot. So let's look at the gray one which summarizes things. Um and then uh the death of despair was at fairly low

the death of despair was at fairly low um um u level started growing during the 1970s. During the 1990s they didn't grow very well. remember the real wages were actually growing through this time and then they really took off after 2000.

then they really took off after 2000. All right. And there is a whole bunch of you know talking about drugs um and so on. I mean there is uh a number of uh other factors affecting it. So it's not

other factors affecting it. So it's not a perfect correlation but um this um uh the main driver there's been a lot of work done this um um I was just recently reading an article uh dissecting uh their um the argument it's not really

their um the argument it's not really despair it turns out that the major drivers that cause suicide alcohol abuse and drugs is um u not just feelings of despair that only if you u you know if you have uh admin minister a

you have uh admin minister a psychological test and you're really down, you're only 50% more likely to commit suicide. But if you're out of work, you're three times more likely to commit suicide or kill yourself by alcohol. If you don't have any social

alcohol. If you don't have any social connections, you're also two and a half times more likely to commit suicide. So the actual approximate factors uh is not necessarily the feelings of dispondency. It's a feeling of being disconnected

It's a feeling of being disconnected from the rest of the um society, not having families and friends and not having worker other workers with whom um you know you can socialize and that and the work that gives meaning to your

the work that gives meaning to your life. But the result um but it is all driven by ultimately is driven by this wealth pump which created which lowered the um u the um wages and increased uh

the um u the um wages and increased uh and increased the number of people outside out of the labor uh force. Right? All right. So the other thing is when I was uh back uh in 2010 here, right? Um I would give similar talks

right? Um I would give similar talks like this and I would say okay well um back in the pre-industrial state you would see huge effect on mortality and so on because that was the Malthusian period but now we live in the post

period but now we live in the post Malusian period. Boy was I wrong. Um in uh fact in 2014 um uh the life expectancy uh for um for Americans started to decline even before

Americans started to decline even before the uh co um um um even before the co uh shock. Now since then it has come up a bit but we are

then it has come up a bit but we are still we are just barely made up that um um that um uh that gap. All right. And of course uh comparative comparable country averages. This is uh OECD

country averages. This is uh OECD countries. So develop economically developed uh liberal uh democracies. They had also some uh shocks and so on. the gap is

some uh shocks and so on. the gap is growing worse than that. This is the average life expectancy. But we'll be talking about in inequality in a minute. What it hides is the huge difference

What it hides is the huge difference between the um the better off and worse off. So recently, just a month ago, John Burn Murdoch of Financial Times gave a great talk. I hope he will publish this

great talk. I hope he will publish this um as an article. So what he did he was comparing um the um uh he divided up the uh population in terms of their uh life

uh population in terms of their uh life expecties into u median life expectancy right what was what was what's been happening to the median life remember median is um it's not average it's uh

median is um it's not average it's uh 50% cut off so median means that 50% of the population do worse and 50% % do better. It's a it's a much better measurement about to tell us what the what the typical person does than the

what the typical person does than the mean because the mean is inflated by really high uh tails. U all right so uh what we see here is that uh this is non-English countries by the way because it turns out that English speaking

it turns out that English speaking countries um have uh not quite as bad situation as US but not quite as good as the rest of the comparable countries. So here you see pretty much the same um uh

here you see pretty much the same um uh dynamic as um in the previous slide. So the mean median is not very different from mean uh here. But let's look at the two tails. So this is the 5% was

two tails. So this is the 5% was shortlived. I mean United States was not great uh even back in 2000 but after 2010 uh the um the worst off uh have declined and they they're way

uh have declined and they they're way down there and we are just just in in other countries we see compression actually right um u different this is different scales here so you have to take that into account but u and during

take that into account but u and during the 20th century The trend was actually compression between the better off and worse off. They were getting more similar in their life expectancy. But that all has changed um in the last uh

that all has changed um in the last uh you know uh 10 10 15 years. But of course the the longived Americans u are not doing so poorly. In fact, they are right in the middle of the Notice that

right in the middle of the Notice that we're talking this is 97 here, right? And this is uh 40 uh7 97 versus 47. I mean uh that's a huge uh

97 versus 47. I mean uh that's a huge uh difference.

Okay. So um so why imiseration is important? That's remember that's the first of my three consequences. uh imiseration for instability. Well uh for the for the obvious reason then imiserated people become unhappy. They

imiserated people become unhappy. They lose um faith in the state structures and um and the societal uh in and their society they live in and they are they become much more likely not just to kill

become much more likely not just to kill themselves but also to participate in violent acts. But by themselves um when we talk about uh the non- elite population it's um this is um not enough

population it's um this is um not enough to overthrow states. It's actually our historical analysis shows that states are not overthrown by revolting peasants or uh workers or anything like that because as long as the state is strong,

because as long as the state is strong, the state apparatus is strong, the police and military and the elites are unified, they are they easily they easily suppress such u such um uh

easily suppress such u such um uh explosions. So back in the days of armored knights, just think about what Tyler rebellion in 1380 uh or no best think about Jakiri. Jakiri was thousands

think about Jakiri. Jakiri was thousands of peasants uh and then like a group of 100 armored knights came and they just killed them off and drove the rest away. Today um uh we see those uh Robocops uh

Today um uh we see those uh Robocops uh heavily armored and uh armed and of course they have no problem uh controlling the uh population. So by it's uh by themselves common people the

it's uh by themselves common people the 90% or even the 99% they um uh they are not u a danger to the state stability. But what uh when we start talking about the elites that's a very different

the elites that's a very different story. So who are the elites? So elites are a small percent of the population who concentrate social power in their hands. Social power comes in four basic flavors. It's coercion or military power. It's economic. It's um

power. It's economic. It's um administrative or political where I can give you orders and you do what I tell you to do. And then the most soft and subtle power is ideological religion or um or social influencers uh and so on

um or social influencers uh and so on and so forth. So um people who concentrate um at every uh u in every branch of this power we have people at the top like generals and police chiefs

the top like generals and police chiefs um CEOs of 500 um um Fortune 500 uh presidents and uh legislators and uh and um uh thought leaders uh in a variety of

um uh thought leaders uh in a variety of ways. Now um uh you cannot say what a percentage it is because um it's it's it's a you know um it's a pyramid. You don't know where to cut it off. The top

don't know where to cut it off. The top 10% um they have a lot of power over their own lives. the one the top 1% has much more power because they order other people around and the top 1% of 1% are really powerful people at at the top of

really powerful people at at the top of all those especially economic and political uh pyramids. All right. Now um so what what is the effect of uh the wealth pump on the elites? Well,

wealth pump on the elites? Well, declining relative wages workers translate into increasingly larger fraction of GDP that goes to the those who consume labor first of all economic elies but also general elites who uh who profit from lower wages

who uh who profit from lower wages because they are the ones who hire people. So what this means is that uh it results in higher rate of upward social mobility not really biological reproductive rates although in the past that uh was quite present in some

that uh was quite present in some societies but mostly the high rate of upward social mobility. So think about um most of the billionaires today they're self-made people right they you know typically it's a CEO of a big company who retires with a golden

company who retires with a golden parachute so how did they get those billions by paying their workers uh less and less essentially less much less than the workers producers so uh so that's uh that results in upward social mobility

that results in upward social mobility but also uh as their numbers grow their consumption levels also grow you have this conspicuous consumption starts to to take root. Um now you would say okay what's wrong with that uh if

say okay what's wrong with that uh if you're not a Marxist it's not claiming uh you know leftist or something like that I mean this is American dream right I mean that's what uh supposed to happen people get rich you know um Ellen Musk you know created several great

you know created several great businesses and so on so forth right uh some other people who did their money in banking and real estate and uh insurance they're probably not quite as slavery uh in uh the origins of their wealth, but

in uh the origins of their wealth, but it's still um uh it's still the American dream. Well, there are problems. Um well, first the first Yeah, here you see this is uh very recent data from

this is uh very recent data from Gabrielle Zukman, right? Who has been agitating in France for a uh wealth tax on billionaires. So, you can see this is pretty dramatic. Here we're talking about uh you know one whatever

about uh you know one whatever 19 richest Americans. All right. So it goes from 0.1% to almost to two essentially. Uh this is a pretty dramatic thing. But this is just the tail of it. It's just 19 individuals.

tail of it. It's just 19 individuals. What's more much more important is what happens to the next layer down. And this is where we see a pretty dramatic story. So let's look at different u uh uh

So let's look at different u uh uh households by wealth. All right. So um for let's look at deca millionaires. So these are households that have wealth of 10 million or more uh in uh inflation

10 million or more uh in uh inflation adjusted dollars. So u we we're keeping the um the threshold uh steady.

So what we see here is back 40 years ago uh there were less than onetenth of a percent. And now they are half a percent. So uh what happened that in the u actually in real this is a prop proportion to population has grown like

proportion to population has grown like 40% or so. Uh but the numbers of deca millionaires grew tenfold. tenfold. Now there you would say there is a lot of happy people out there but um there

of happy people out there but um there are con some consequences. So um first of all um as the numbers grow this is especially true for pre-industrial societies. They very soon overshoot their productive base, the

overshoot their productive base, the peasantry and start oppressing them because there are lots of uh knights and uh um and priests uh uh and government officials but the peasants are still uh

officials but the peasants are still uh the same number and so uh they start oppressing them and extracting um uh produce products from them. But um in um

produce products from them. But um in um uh our um uh society the other um opponent uh the other problem is much more prevalent. The problem is this that um the number of power positions is

um the number of power positions is limited um especially this is true in the political arena. So think about it in the United States you have only one president, 100 senators and so on and so forth down to state legislatures and

forth down to state legislatures and things like that. Now um the problem is that u many of those uh deca billionaires not all small proportion of them they have political ambitions.

ambitions. So now we have uh 10 times as many uh politically ambitious wealthy people

uh and that is clearly you can see clearly uh this in the number of uh the competition for political positions starts to heat up. So here's for example some data on how many so-called millionaires people who spend at least half a million of their money. So you can see they have doubled roughly

can see they have doubled roughly speaking uh from uh just in like 10 years or so. The cost of uh winning uh uh winning in um uh elections has been growing. This is also in u uh inflation

growing. This is also in u uh inflation adjusted dollars but but that has been reported quite a lot. So these are all um um signs of intensifying competition for political uh office in the United

for political uh office in the United States. So what happens is that uh now that we have uh too many um too many aspirants right elite for who are vying for the fixed number of

who are vying for the fixed number of positions the number of losers starts to get out of hand. So think about it I use the game of musical chairs to illustrate this. So only you start with uh 10

this. So only you start with uh 10 chairs and 11 players right the music uh plays you know one person gets frustrated but then instead of removing chairs you keep adding players so you have uh 11 players and 12 players 15 20

have uh 11 players and 12 players 15 20 actually 10 times we have 100 players now for 10 chairs all right so you can imagine that on on the road to this um uh uh some at some point things will

uh uh some at some point things will start breaking down so uh this um and uh those surplus elites uh made uh they turn into what we call counter elites who not all of them again some proportion of them and those um are the

proportion of them and those um are the ones who decide to challenge the um uh the um uh existing order. So this is the second consequence of the wealth pump. So this was seen very clearly in

So this was seen very clearly in elections of 2016. At that time 17 major candidates, one of them uh one of them 17 only one chair, right? So one of them started breaking rules. He was very effective at that. And he was they tried

effective at that. And he was they tried to some of them those tried to emulate him but he was he was better than that. And by the way in uh 2020 there was like um 22 major candidates on

there was like um 22 major candidates on the Democratic side. So it's not just All right. So um um so the third consequence I've been talking about one um source of elite over production um

um source of elite over production um which is um the uh over production of wealthers but in the United States and other uh comparable countries the uh the dominant factions of the elites are economic and

factions of the elites are economic and political. So um those holders are obviously on top of the economic pyramid, power pyramid. But uh if you want to um to become uh a politician,

want to um to become uh a politician, you need to go the credential uh route uh or even if you want to get into the upper 10% for example of wealth distribution. The problem is that uh we

distribution. The problem is that uh we have now huge over production of such um of such elite aspirants. They're not elites. They are elite wannabes. So back in 1950s less than 15% went into of the

in 1950s less than 15% went into of the school uh graduates went into college. Now over 60 in fact it was 66 a few years ago. It has declined uh since then. And so what do you do when you have to compete with such huge number?

have to compete with such huge number? You get an advanced degree. All right. So we can see this uh the wealth premium from the bachelor's degree was declining. This is the birth cohort. So n people who were born in

cohort. So n people who were born in 1980s they go to college in early 2000s and they are now uh in the uh labor uh market. But if um you want um uh so you

market. But if um you want um uh so you you have to get advanced degree PhD MD but if you want to go into politics you get what law degree and so we see this here. So um just let's look at this one. the number of lawyers per 10,000

the number of lawyers per 10,000 population all right was here's the uh integrated period I mean this is uh yeah we need lawyers I mean I have nothing against lawyers but then suddenly after 1970 it just exploded why because um um

1970 it just exploded why because um um because it became the this is the credential route to into the elites and really weird things happen this is the distribution of salaries for uh members of the class of 20 for

for uh members of the class of 20 for example of um from the law school. This is really weird. You almost never see distributions like this. Typically it's it looks

it looks I lost my um did I push the

I lost my pointer. Ah see no yeah it died. No it's okay. It's back right. Usually you see, you know, like a a mode and then long tail, but this is weird. And that that's what it looked like back in the 1990s. But by 2010, suddenly this

the 1990s. But by 2010, suddenly this part of the pig has run away and it's still that way. Uh I checked the latest data for 2024. It's still like this only the whole thing moved to the right. What this means is that this is the wonderful

this means is that this is the wonderful illustration of um how intense elite intra elite competition results in a smaller pool of winners and a larger pool of losers. These guys who were

pool of losers. These guys who were earning 50k, they don't even have most of them don't even have enough um uh income to pay off the um the um uh it's working now for some reason. Yeah, don't

working now for some reason. Yeah, don't worry. they don't even have half of them don't have enough money to pay off like 200 or 300,000 uh dollar uh debts they incurred and so this is uh this is the

incurred and so this is uh this is the uh breeding ground for counter elites and it turns out that Castro was a lawyer Leen was a lawyer Gandhi a lawyer a lawyer

lawyer Gandhi a lawyer a lawyer Maximillian Rob a lawyer turns out that lawyers are the most dangerous profession from the point of view of the state. All right. So um um so this is uh and if

All right. So um um so this is uh and if you look at actually in United States the Yale Law School that's uh uh that's the best uh breeding ground for counter you know this guy one night guy um the old keepers right uh I forget his name

old keepers right uh I forget his name he was he he was trained in yellow old school guy anyway um all right I want to wrap things up because let's see yeah uh I've got about 70 minutes so um what What I want to do now is first of all

What I want to do now is first of all emphasize that I've been hitting the highlights here. Uh things are humans social systems are complex. So I've been

social systems are complex. So I've been talking about um the how um uh um um um im immeasureration produces mass mobilization potential and that it is by itself not enough. All right. And I was

itself not enough. All right. And I was talking about how intel elite competition both of these are consequences of the wealth pump that produces intra elite u conflicts and uh uh and and the rise of the counter

uh and and the rise of the counter rates. Now this together is an explosive combination because um the uh mass mass mobilization potential provides the raw energy right but it needs to be

energy right but it needs to be organized and directed. So Trump um has done precisely what many other populist u politicians have done in the past. Do you know that the first populist party you know in history was actually in

you know in history was actually in Rome. It was called popular. So Graus Gaos Graus and Antibious Graus were the leaders of this party. So was Caesar by the way two generations later. So uh so

the way two generations later. So uh so the uh uh those uh the populist politicians mobilize uh mass mobilization potential to overthrow the established elites. Now I didn't talk much about that but um you know if you

much about that but um you know if you are interested uh obviously my in my book uh I I actually cover a lot of these uh things. This is this could be also important but I don't have much time to talk about it because I want to talk a little bit about the aftermath.

talk a little bit about the aftermath. All right. Uh so uh my good friend and co-author Walter Shidel

a few years ago published um a very nice book. It's called the great leveler. So basically death is the great leveler. He he was asking somewhat different question. He was asking how does u uh inequality tends to grow under uh

inequality tends to grow under uh favorable conditions. This is sort of PT rule right but then um why aren't we all over the last 10,000 years if that was an continuous trend then everything would be owned by one person and we all

would be owned by one person and we all would be emiserated. So we know that actually inequality declines. So he was asking why and his argument is that typically it's major violent shocks. uh either mass manipulation for affair, transformative revolution, state

transformative revolution, state failure, collapse, lethal pandemics and things like that. So uh to me inequality is not a driver. Inequality is a proxy for the uh twin processes of immeasuration and elite over production.

immeasuration and elite over production. Right? Inequality results because we have uh imiseration one hand and elite production on the other hand. But so the drivers are um mass mobilization potential and intrade conflict right

potential and intrade conflict right that's one thing second thing is that um I'm not quite as um uh pessimistic as uh as water so my take is that water is about 85 to 90% correct but there is uh

about 85 to 90% correct but there is uh we have now uh studied u um dozens actually u almost 200 100 uh past societies sliding into crisis and emerging from it. So we can now do some

emerging from it. So we can now do some statistics about um what are the routes. So in principle um this is what we call the ginko model, right? It turns out that the route the road to crisis is fairly channelized. It's really like a

fairly channelized. It's really like a massive ball rolling down a valley narrow valley and it's very it's impossible to stop it and you cannot deflect it really. you just get smashed. All right. Unfortunately, that's uh that's the uh the the quality of

that's the uh the the quality of dynamics. This is where all the trajectories are converging. But then once you get to the cusp of crisis, then the whole set of avenues. It's like the ball rolls now and um you can roll left right to better outcomes to worse

right to better outcomes to worse outcomes. So that's what this golo leaf u all right. And so yeah, so here's another way you you the pre-crisis trajectory collective is declining then suddenly break there's a social pressures for crisis growing there's a

pressures for crisis growing there's a break and then uh you have a whole bunch of different avenues. So um what we did we looked at I think it's 170 societies here. So we look at the crisis and we

here. So we look at the crisis and we scored them by a variety of um indicators of severity. Was there was the population affected? Was the population collapse? Was there a little epidemic? Uh what happened to the elites? What happened to the ruler, the

elites? What happened to the ruler, the state and so on? So um when we uh um when we look at the aggregated uh index basically adding up all the bad things, right? We find there's several things to

right? We find there's several things to find. First of all, um there is like what is it? there's like 12 or so different things but you see that most uh crisis have maybe between four and

uh crisis have maybe between four and seven of the bad consequences. So um the paper we published on this is that um um every uh we just stole the line from

every uh we just stole the line from Anakin that every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way. Every family happy family is happy in the same way but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way. Every uh crisis is unhappy in their own way. There is

unhappy in their own way. There is always all kinds of different combinations. Now that's one thing. Um and really not there are no cases when everything happens. So okay but the other thing is that um

So okay but the other thing is that um here um at at the lower level we still see there there is actually quite a bunch of cases where the severity uh is pretty low. So uh uh so that means this

pretty low. So uh uh so that means this is about 10 to 15% of cases where the um uh where societies actually manage to navigate the shows of crisis without a major revolution or bloody civil war or

major revolution or bloody civil war or uh exterminating the elites or things like that. So um some examples um are um the um uh new deal in United States, the chartist period in uh England and a few

chartist period in uh England and a few others I desri discuss in my books. So um just a few things u the structural demographic theory was uh first proposed in 1991's book by Jack Goldstone who's very much around and part of our

very much around and part of our cleodnamic community. He's now actually editorin chief of the journal cleodnamics. So secular cycles with my Russian colleague Serge we published on um uh

colleague Serge we published on um uh eight different secular cycles in Rome ancient Rome uh medieval England France and mo early modern Russia France uh and England. This is the ages of discord is my technical book which has a lot of

my technical book which has a lot of those things and of course the end times is my u u my trade book. So um so essentially general conclusions are that structural causes of end pumps times the

structural causes of end pumps times the ultimate one is the wealth pump that actually drives everything including state uh weakness uh and crumbling right. Um so in past societies usually uh this uh structural conditions usually

uh this uh structural conditions usually ended up with major outbreaks. So 85 to 90% of the uh cases we have really major outbreaks of political uh violence. All right. And uh as I was giving this talk

right. And uh as I was giving this talk back in the 201s and around 2018 19, I would just have this thing because uh it was actually kind of like um you know like one of those horror movies that you see the ball rolling to ah yeah you know

see the ball rolling to ah yeah you know in Indiana Jones remember the ball was rolling and you see it and you see it uh so 2010 2014 2017 it just keeps rolling.

so 2010 2014 2017 it just keeps rolling. So it was kind of um um uh unpleasant unpleasant feeling because I I live in United States myself. All right, we are now in revolution. So I say that we are

now in revolution. So I say that we are now in true revolution as as of um uh January 20 of 2025 when Trump became president. So um I have um I've written about them on my blog. Essentially uh

about them on my blog. Essentially uh Trump is wrecking things. All right. Um and uh and that's what revolutions do. Uh so uh there in my definition revolution is when there is first of all attempt to replace the ruling elites and

attempt to replace the ruling elites and that's very clear and secondly it's the way it's if it's trans if it's transformative evolution it's uh revolution it's to transform state institutions. So both of these are present fortunately we don't have the

present fortunately we don't have the guillotine at least yet right. So now you just uh you get you just fire all the people in USA ID. All right. So that's uh it's dramatic but it's better

that's uh it's dramatic but it's better than to have your head cut off. Um and just a couple uh things to say that um we were recently we are now looking at much more carefully about how societies get out of crisis. We were fortunate to

get out of crisis. We were fortunate to get uh my group at social complexity science hub in Vienna that got uh a three-year grants which started this year. So we'll be doing a lot of this

year. So we'll be doing a lot of this and u um you know you've seen some of this right uh and uh a bunch of other things that I um uh I've been talking about. If you want to follow the story,

about. If you want to follow the story, I've got a substack on which I publish at least once a week and uh you can learn more about how things happen.

learn more about how things happen. Good. Thanks. I'm finished before 7.

Thank you. you've given us a lot uh to think about and I'm going to hand over to my colleague Sarah Walker, deputy director of the Beyond Center to moderate the Q&A. >> Thank you so much. Um I'm sure after such a similar talk, we have tons of

such a similar talk, we have tons of questions, especially given that we all want to know what's going to happen next. Um so, uh who would like to ask a question? We have some mics we can pass around the room, too.

room, too. So, um, hello. You talked about the death the Oh, can you hear me? Hello? Can you hear me? No. Is it on? >> Check. >> Check. One, two, three. >> Okay.

>> Okay. >> Hello. >> Okay. So, okay. >> So, you talked a bit about the death of despair. Could you um differentiate that from suicide? I didn't quite understand the differentiation between those two

the differentiation between those two categories. So they actually so u the death of despair has have three components. Suicide rate is one of them. Alcohol abuse and is another one and drug abuse is the third one. So all the

drug abuse is the third one. So all the argument of um um uh of these two economists was that u they are related and you can see that they were sort of moving uh together. Um and though even though it's despair maybe uh a little

though it's despair maybe uh a little bit of a misnomer because as I said it's mostly lack of connections and you know uh and having been in a bad bad uh situation economic especially economic situation but um it's um uh this has

situation but um it's um uh this has been u supported by um recent research quite well actually in addition to that um we see um uh overall the uh the access the Traffic accidents have been

access the Traffic accidents have been declining, but people people in this category tend to die in car accidents far more much more frequently than others. So, it's a it's a general uh it's a general social it's a general social ill.

social ill. >> So, uh we have a question up there. Uh do we have a mic that we can

>> can we go back to the slide that you have of the resilience of society? Assessing resilience. You just passed it. it. >> Maybe the second to last one. >> Yeah, this one. And I wonder if we can just spend a moment with this and sort of expand out on it just a bit so we can

of expand out on it just a bit so we can understand what you've scaffolded here as you, you know, speak to because you you've talked about how we're in this revolution or revolution-like situation and the kind of wrecking and the kind of

and the kind of wrecking and the kind of grabbing of power and grabbing of assets that's going down during this destructive period. And I just want to know how that is matching up with this resilience sort of dialogue that you're

resilience sort of dialogue that you're or work that's happening here. >> Yes. So let me first define resilience in um in in terms um that we use. U resilience is different from stability.

resilience is different from stability. Stability is simply return to uh in equilibrium after perturbation. Resilience is a broader thing. it um when when um external environment changes in the way that uh damages

changes in the way that uh damages function of a of a system right a resilient system will evolve will adapt to it. So specifically for human societies we are uh talking about uh

societies we are uh talking about uh what is the function of our uh societies ideally the provision of broadly based well-being. All right. So when uh external situations change uh or even internal situations change as a result

internal situations change as a result of unit of over reproduction and mass mobilization right can the system adapt to these new conditions and regain function by providing uh this well-being. So in a better in a few

well-being. So in a better in a few examples for example such as uh new deal actually it's not just new deal it was the but about 30 year period of American history starting from the progressive era from roughly speaking 1900 1900 to

era from roughly speaking 1900 1900 to uh and then that's the good movement started and then it was sort of set in stone well at least until 1970s set in stone by the new deal and you saw that effect was uh on well-being

effect was uh on well-being of um American workers wages grew dramatically the deaths of despair declined was dramatic increase in u in life expectancy and things like that. So this is so this is uh that system showed

this is so this is uh that system showed resiliency but in the civil war United States showed lack of resilience because um the it was a real it was a real democracy in 1950s sorry 1850s right but

democracy in 1950s sorry 1850s right but it could not handle the stresses of u of elite over production and mass adviseration that happened uh during the preceding 30 years.

>> So, uh, thank you very much. It was very interesting talk. I I want to question your um your claim that we're in a revolution. It doesn't seem to me like we're in a revolution at all. That you you haven't changed the elites. In fact,

you haven't changed the elites. In fact, uh the the same uh major companies that were important uh you know uh in 2000 are now important. you know, today it's it's uh the the the the billion the same

it's uh the the the the billion the same billionaires who were uh operating under Biden are operating now. Uh there are a lot of continuities between Trump's policies. Uh Obama was the deorter and chief and uh Trump has has uh you know

chief and uh Trump has has uh you know he was called the deorter-in-chief because he he deported a lot of uh immigrants. Uh the the um and and Trump of course has intensified this. Uh so so I'm not I don't really see how this is a revolution.

revolution. >> Yeah. Well um first of all uh what I said was more true about the first few months under Trump when he made a big

months under Trump when he made a big effort to um uh to um uh uh to u cause to overthrow essentially the established elites. Right? And keep in mind that Ellen Musk who was there at

mind that Ellen Musk who was there at the time all right is a counter elite in many ways. He was actually um he has a some chip on the shoulder because he was treated poorly by the previous administrations and uh his um goal with

administrations and uh his um goal with um uh Doge was to actually clean house. that was unsuccessful uh well mostly unsuccessful but uh but he is part of that counter culture

he is part of that counter culture according to my definitions. Now to give you perspective and we live day by day but when you look at history things happen much more slower than you think the French Revolution um uh took 10

the French Revolution um uh took 10 years uh between um Bastil and the coming of Napoleon right so we we've just been one year into this and prince revolution went back and forth and there

revolution went back and forth and there were the first uh uh bunch of countries who came to power were guillotin then the next one was also guillotin and they all got overthrown by Napoleon. So now um in my view uh Trump is mismanaging

um in my view uh Trump is mismanaging things so much that um that u they will be out who knows when uh 20 26 or 2028 uh right then we'll have another and so

uh right then we'll have another and so typically what happens is that um those pe people who come to power they don't really know what to do in most cases all right and so they try different things you know the French revolution if you look about it. Think about it. It's just

look about it. Think about it. It's just the first 10 years, but actually the age of revolution in France went from 1789 to 1870. The Paris Commune, it took seven uh took uh 80 years and there was there was one revolution after every 15

there was one revolution after every 15 years they had a revolution or something like that. They were trying to figure things out. Finally, uh after 1870, they figured things out. They had the belly poke. um the worker wages shot uh and the well-being just went through the

the well-being just went through the roof and they had a great uh thing going even despite World War I and things like that. But it took them um three generations to figure it out. And so unfortunately hopefully for us it will

unfortunately hopefully for us it will take less time because that's what that's what this grant is about. So um maybe I didn't. So our uh question is u um not only how societies lose that resilience but how do they regain it all

resilience but how do they regain it all right and so that there I've been talking about structural um variables 99% of the time here but in fact once the ball gets to that cusp our working hypothesis is that this is where the

hypothesis is that this is where the leaders and especially their network support networks can push the ball in either good or bad uh direction and so um because um because trajectories are diverging at that point. uh it's very

diverging at that point. uh it's very sensitive dependence and so on one hand it's good because individual actions can actually change things but on the other hand it's very hard to study scientifically that's why we need hundreds of cases to to do good

hundreds of cases to to do good statistics and that's what this grant is about and also in this grant we will uh attempt to replicate the prediction uh for United States which I did 16 years ago for 12 countries we'll publish the

ago for 12 countries we'll publish the predictions and wait 10 years and see how that uh works out and I fully expect that after time you'll be very wrong but that's the whole point of doing research

that's the whole point of doing research to learn new uh things.

Yeah. So you talk about how um the wealth pump can increase how how many elites there are and increase competition among elites which motivates some uh counter elites to try to destabilize the system to acquire more resources for themselves in order to sustain themselves. And I I was just

sustain themselves. And I I was just hoping that you could maybe give some more clarity on what exactly these resources are because like on an individual level it doesn't seem really prudent to like like it doesn't seem like the best way to maximize personal wealth is to like go up against an establishment, right? And it seems like

establishment, right? And it seems like that anyone who's in a position to meaningfully disrupt the establishment would already have enough personal resources such that you know like wealth I don't know it's hard for me to imagine would be the primary motivation. And so you know these individuals who are running up the against the establishment

running up the against the establishment the counter leads like what like in what sense are they motivated by resources exactly? Yeah, this is a very good question because I gave you too much of a rational agent explanation for

much of a rational agent explanation for counter elites. But in fact the approximate factors are typically not I mean there is a saying in Russian that a successful revolution means 10,000 you

successful revolution means 10,000 you know positions um right u and uh that's true and so some people probably are motivated by that but um the actual when you start studying their lives as revol revolutionaries or even failed

revolutionaries or even failed revolutionaries for example um it's it's very useful to read um the um uh memoirs of the weather underground. All right. What I mean they were not trying to feather their nest. They typically came

feather their nest. They typically came from pretty good um upper middle class positions and things like that. No, they were motivated by rage. So, so if you look at those people like Lenin and uh

look at those people like Lenin and uh and Caster, they all came from pretty uh Lenin was um uh uh a nobleman actually and he owned well he owned land with peasants of peasants of free at the

peasants of peasants of free at the time. Uh Caster came from a very wealthy um family. All right. And um and so on and so forth. So um what happens is that

and so forth. So um what happens is that uh uh the conditions um that uh um that huge growth of disparities of inequality and suffering of the majority of the population immigration of the majority

population immigration of the majority of the population they um provide the ideological um fuel for um or attempts to overthrow the state. So most revolutionaries

the state. So most revolutionaries actually start not most because some of them are quite instrumental and and very rational but most of them are driven by the huge sense of injustice.

the huge sense of injustice. Now once they get into power things again start changing but but the m the the u uh their ability to self-sacrifice. So we know for example that humans um are quite heterogeneous

that humans um are quite heterogeneous as agents. So we have maybe um typical you know if you do play the public goods game here for these people we'll find that 25% plus minus are rational agents

that 25% plus minus are rational agents they will not contribute to public uh goods game unless they are punished right then another 20% they are pure outris they will always keep contributing even though one thinks and then there's that 50 to 60% are moralistic punishers these are

moralistic punishers these are conditional cooperators and Um so they will actually spend their own money to punish free riders and um and uh we know actually their motivations very well

actually their motivations very well because uh clever experimentalists stuck them into the brain scanning uh things and they found that when they start punishing which part of their brain brain lights up the they get really incensed. All right and they get their

incensed. All right and they get their sense of justice gets completely activated and they're willing to pay a lot of to to punish things. So think about this is a good model for many of the radical radical counter elilitates. >> Um so I think we might have time for one

>> Um so I think we might have time for one last question. Um and then we'll leave it at that. So uh we have a very enthusiastic hand up in the back and we want to try to get some students. Um so we'll uh can you all the way in the back Jessica way up there. Sorry. Um but per

Jessica way up there. Sorry. Um but per yeah yeah trying to get some more students to get opportunities to ask questions. Um it is this thing on? Can y'all hear me? >> Yeah. >> Okay. So do you think that because you mentioned the uh wealth uh the wealthy

mentioned the uh wealth uh the wealthy elite having like sorts of like through four sources of power whether it was like uh administrative uh political military and then you mentioned like a more soft subtle power which was like influence, religion, radical ideology.

influence, religion, radical ideology. So throughout history we've had a lot there have been like in many parts of societies all across the world you've had elites who exerted a lot of religious influence and cultural influence that impacts society whether

influence that impacts society whether it was geopolitically culturally or um economically. Do you think that in those certain cases whether it was like you know during the times of ancient Sumeriia or Rome or even like medieval Europe or ancient China that these

Europe or ancient China that these religious elites or elites that might use religion uh they would look at like you know environmental changes whether it was like a natural disaster or celestial changes like a solar eclipse or a lunar eclipse and you know use

or a lunar eclipse and you know use those examples and those interpretations as a means to justify by uh either economic uh concentration of power or geopolitical changes like going to war or changes in government that sort of

or changes in government that sort of thing. >> So um yeah this is a very good question. So one thing I didn't mention is that um the structural demographic model when we apply it to any particular society we have to tailor it because different

have to tailor it because different societies have um different um um sources of power that are that tend to be um uh that tend to be emphasized. So in my book uh in times I argue that United States is a plutoaucracy. uh the

United States is a plutoaucracy. uh the out the uh the main source of uh power is wealth which and but also it works with collaboration with political edits and wealth completely dominates both the ideological through u you know through

ideological through u you know through ownings of newspapers and so on so forth and military uh power right so for example generals uh get pushy positions uh in companies after they retire right

uh in companies after they retire right but that's different so if you look at Iran For example, Iran is one of the rare examples today where the elites uh the the reigning elite is ideological elite. But um essentially they are all

elite. But um essentially they are all susceptible to the same problems of elite over production, right? The uh even when Christian um um uh religious uh religious leaders try to control the population by not allowing to have

population by not allowing to have children, right? they still uh had nepots and so on so forth. So elitist always find a way to uh to overproduce themselves. Now um as to your other question which is sort of separate using

question which is sort of separate using um you know natural disasters as a way well that is u that is actually not just religious elites in fact that could be used against religious elites. So back in China, uh famines or huge uh natural

in China, uh famines or huge uh natural disasters would put in um uh question the mandate of heaven. And something like this we had happen in 2020 when COVID came. Uh it really delegitimized

COVID came. Uh it really delegitimized our our uh United States government because their response was just so pathetic. All right. So um these natural disasters uh uh they can be used by any

disasters uh uh they can be used by any kind of counter elites not just uh religious uh ones astronomical um yeah so uh but yeah so predictable astronomical events um like

predictable astronomical events um like in Maya calendar and so on yeah they were used by elites to legitimize uh themselves because they could predict the you know you start uh you know that the rains will come right eventually you start praying and suddenly the rains

start praying and suddenly the rains come uh and so that's uh but that's not um a big route to legitimate legitimation actually it just happens in some societies >> so uh let's thank our speaker I think all of us will think about the patterns

all of us will think about the patterns in history quite differently um and have some books to read and thank you all for coming out tonight um and uh joining us for the beyond annual lecture appreciate seeing you all thank you >> and thank you all for listening and

>> and thank you all for listening and asking and great questions. >> That was excellent. Thank you so much. That was great. >> Thank you so much.

>> Let's just connect my >> uh Yeah, one second here. Uh,